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To explain the uncanny holding power that some 
technologies seem to have, this paper presents a theory of 
charisma as attached to technology. It uses the One Laptop 
per Child project as a case study for exploring the features, 
benefits, and pitfalls of charisma. It then contextualizes 
OLPC’s charismatic power in the historical arc of other 
charismatic technologies, highlighting the enduring nature of 
charisma and the common themes on which the charisma of a 
century of technological progress rests. In closing, it 
discusses how scholars and practitioners in human-computer 
interaction might use the concept of charismatic technology 
in their own work.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Scholars have noted the holding power that some 
technologies seem to have – a power that goes beyond mere 
form or function to stimulate devotion, yearning, even 
fanaticism [2,39,44,62]. While Apple products, especially 
iPhones, are often held up as the most common example of 
this holding power [11,31,37,40,52,56], it exists in various 
forms for many technologies, from sports cars to strollers.  
This paper describes this holding power as charisma. 
Applying Weber’s theory of charismatic authority [68] to 
objects, it presents a case study of a technology that was 
highly charismatic to its makers and supporters (and remains 
so to a devoted core): the One Laptop per Child (OLPC) 
project’s “XO” laptop. With about two and a half million in 
use globally, OLPC’s green-and-white XO remains a focal 
point for discourses about children, technology, and 
education, even a decade after its 2005 debut. This analysis 
explores the roots of the laptop’s charisma and the important 
role that charisma played in OLPC’s heady early days. It then 
reflects on the charismatic elements present in this project in 
relation to the charisma of past technologies. This historical 
perspective highlights the ideological commonalities between 
all of these charismatic objects. It also suggests that far from 
being a new phenomenon, charismatic technologies have 
been captivating their users and admirers for decades, and 
will likely continue to do so for decades to come. We will see 
that charismatic technologies help establish and reinforce the 
ideological underpinnings of the status quo through utopian 
promises [39] – promises that persist even when the 
technology does not deliver.  
The goal of this paper is to expose the ideological stakes that 
buttress charismatic technologies. Those who create, study, 
or work with technology ignore the origins of charisma at 
their own peril – at the risk of always being blinded by the 
next best thing, with little concept of the larger cultural 
context that technology operates within and little hope for 
long-term change. Recognizing and critically examining 
charisma can help us understand the effects it can have and 
then, if we choose, to counter them. However, it is also 
important to acknowledge that charisma can smooth away 
uncertainties and help us handle contradictions and obstacles. 
As such, the purpose of this paper is not to ‘prove’ charisma 
‘wrong,’ because its rightness or wrongness is beside the 
point. As we will see, what matters is whether a technology’s 
charisma is still alive. 
This paper provides a framework for understanding how 
charisma operates in relation to technologies, how it might be 
identified, and what is at stake when we are drawn in. It 
provides tools for identifying charismatic technologies and 
teasing out the implications of this charisma, from the 
hardware and software of the object itself to the ensembles, 
agendas, and trajectories of the globalized organizations 
around it [18], and back down to the ways that those same 
groups shift, contest, or perpetuate the object’s charisma. 
This borrows from Actor-Network Theory the idea that 
nonhuman “actors” have agency in technosocial discourses 
[33], and from Value-Sensitive Design a normative 
examination of the ways in which the myriad values 
influence design and use [19]. This analysis adds to these 
theories a detailed case study of the role that charismatic 
authority plays in the design and use of technologies, digging 
beneath professed values to identify the ideological 
underpinnings upon which values, and charisma, rest. 
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METHODS AND SOCIAL-HISTORICAL ORIENTATION 
This paper draws on archival research, interviews, and 
ethnographic observations conducted between 2008 and 
2015. This includes an investigation of the forty-year 
development of the ideas behind One Laptop per Child 
(OLPC) through a review of the project’s mailing lists, wikis, 
and discussion boards; the publication history of its founders; 
and interviews with some developers. The author also 
conducted seven months of fieldwork of an OLPC project in 
Latin America (see [5,6,53]), but this data is not directly 
included here. Analysis followed an iterative, inductive 
approach common in anthropology and cultural studies, 
combining the themes that emerge ground-up from a 
thorough understanding of participants’ worldviews with a 
critical interpretation of these themes as ‘texts’ able to 
expand or contest broader theoretical questions [10].  
This paper contextualizes the patterns noted in OLPC’s 
rhetoric and design within the broader arc of technological 
development, as told by historians of technology. The 
combination of historical and contemporary data lends itself 
to reaching beyond the often bounded scope of qualitative 
research to answer more long-ranging questions about the 
trajectory of technological development and use. 
THEORIZING CHARISMATIC TECHNOLOGIES 
To explain the holding power that OLPC’s laptop has had on 
technologists and others around the world, I develop the idea 
of a charismatic technology. This section defines charisma, 
outlines the salient features of charismatic technologies, and 
details the connection between charisma and related concepts 
from social theory including fetishism, religion, 
technological determinism, and ideology. 
Charisma as a sociological construct was theorized by Max 
Weber to describe the exceptional, even magical, authority 
that religious leaders seem to have over followers. In contrast 
to (though sometimes subsumed by) other types of authority, 
such as traditional or legal/rational, charismatic authority is 
legitimized by followers through a belief that a leader has 
extraordinary, even divine, powers that are not available to 
ordinary people [68]. 
Though charisma is generally used to describe the power of 
humans, not objects, it has been applied to nonhumans as 
well. Maria Stavrinaki, for instance, describes the Bauhaus 
African Chair as a ‘charismatic object’ within the Bauhaus 
community [57]. Relatedly, Anna Tsing [59] discusses how 
the idea of globalization has been charismatic to some 
academics, who uncritically naturalize or even reinforce 
globalist agendas by characterizing globalization as universal 
and inevitable. Tsing’s model of charisma – a destabilizing 
force that both elicits excitement and produces material 
effects in the world (even if these effects differ from those 
that were promised) – is at play here as well.  
By treating an object as charismatic, these approaches, and 
this paper as well, utilize perspectives from actor-network 
theory (ANT), which subject both human and non-human 
‘actors’ to the same analytical lens in a mutually-constituted 
network of relations [33]. ANT, however, tends to neglect the 
beliefs that underlie these networks, especially if these beliefs 
do not take material form [34:2]. Thus, while ANT provides 
tools for analyzing the ‘scripts’ that designers build into 
technologies [1], it falls short of providing the means to 
account for how ideological frameworks animate or inhabit 
these products – a gap charisma can fill.  
Distinct from fetishism’s focus on form, which stipulates a 
fixation on the materiality of the (presumably) passive object 
itself as a source of power, a charismatic object derives its 
power experientially and symbolically through the possibility 
or promise of action: what is important is not what the object 
is but what it promises to do. Thus, the material form of a 
charismatic technology is less important than how it invokes 
the imagination. As sociologist Donald McIntosh [36] 
explains, “charisma is not so much a quality as an 
experience. The charismatic object or person is experienced 
as possessed by and transmitting an uncanny and compelling 
force.” A charismatic technology’s promises are likewise 
uncannily compelling, evoking feelings of awe, 
transcendence, and connection to a greater purpose [39,44]. 
Charisma moreover implies a persistence of this compelling 
force even when an object’s actions do not match its 
promises – hence the magical element of charisma. This is 
where a charismatic technology’s link to religious experience  
is especially strong, as a system built on faith that is 
maintained and strengthened outside of (or even counter to) 
the auspices of ‘evidence’ [2]. This is also one of the places 
that the consequences of charisma are most visible, as a 
technology’s devotees maintain their devotion even in the 
face of contradictions.  
This potential for charisma to override ‘rational’ thought is 
something that is not lost on marketers. While they may not 
call it as much, their promotions often tap into the charisma 
that certain technologies have, and journalists often echo it as 
well. In fact, religion scholar William Stahl examines the 
popular discourses about technology and concludes that “our 
language about technology is implicitly religious” [56:3]. 
Other scholars have also documented the connections 
between technology and religion, highlighting the prevalence 
of religious language in branding discourse [37,40,52,56], 
revealing parallels between religious and engineering 
practice [2], or showing how specific technologies are 
rhetorically connected to divinity and redemption in use 
[11,28,31,39]. Thus, while charismatic objects construct and 
reinforce their own charisma, media are often implicated in 
amplifying it, as we will see below.  
In their often utopian promises of action, charismatic 
technologies are deceptive: they make both technological 
adoption and social change appear straightforward instead of 
a difficult process fraught with choices and politics. This 
gives charismatic technologies a determinist spirit, where 
technological progress appears natural, even inevitable. This 
naturalizing element can lead us to underestimate the 
sustained commitment needed for technological adoption. In 
building out the railroad in the mid-nineteenth century, for 
instance, Nye shows that the charisma of the locomotive led 
to the U.S. paying an enormous price in resources and lives 
in an attempt to realize the utopian promises of rail [44]. By 
the same token, charisma’s naturalizing force can make 
critique and debate appear unnatural. 
However, charisma contains an irony. A charismatic 
technology may promise to transform its users’ 
sociotechnical existence for the better, but it is, at heart, 
fundamentally conservative. Just as charismatic leaders 
confirm and amplify their audiences’ existing worldviews to 
cultivate their appeal [36], a charismatic technology’s appeal 
is built on existing systems of meaning-making and largely 
confirms the value of existing stereotypes, institutions, and 
power relations. This unchallenging familiarity is what 
makes a charismatic technology alluring to its target 
audience: even as it promises certain benefits, it 
simultaneously confirms that the worldview of its audience is 
already ‘right’ and that, moreover, they are even savvier to 
have this technology bolster it.  
This worldview that charisma reinforces is what social 
theorists refer to as an ideology: a framework of norms that 
shape thoughts and actions. Cultural theorist Stuart Hall 
describes an ideology as a “system for coding reality” that 
“becomes autonomous in relation to the consciousness or 
intention of its agents” [22:71]. We live with many 
ideologies, reinforced not just by charisma but across our 
socio-political landscape: neoliberal economics, patriarchal 
social structures, and Judeo-Christian ethics are among the 
many dominant ideologies in the United States, for instance.  
Hall notes that ‘ideology’ has been useful in social theory as 
“a way of representing the order of things which endowed its 
limited perspectives with that natural or divine inevitability 
which makes them appear universal, natural and coterminous 
with ‘reality’ itself” [22:65]. What is important in this 
definition is the way that ideology fades into the background: 
by one metaphor commonly used in anthropology, ideologies 
are as invisible to most people as we imagine water is to a 
fish [15:123]. In Hall’s words, an ideology “works” because 
it “represses any recognition of the contingency of the 
historical conditions on which all social relations depend. It 
represents them, instead, as outside of history: unchangeable, 
inevitable and natural” [22:76]. By referencing and 
reinforcing existing ideological norms, charismatic 
technologies by extension can also appear ‘unchangeable, 
inevitable and natural.’ 
Thus, charismatic technologies help establish and reinforce 
the ideological underpinnings of the status quo. They do so 
through promises that may persist among true believers even 
when the technology does not deliver. The task of this paper, 
then, is to “break the spell of the present” [56], exposing the 
ideological stakes that underpin charisma. Technologists 
ignore the origins of charisma at their own peril – at the risk 
of always being blinded by the next best thing, with little 
concept of the larger cultural context that technology 
operates within and little hope for long-term change. 
Recognizing and critically examining charisma might, as 
Mosco explains, “help us to loosen the powerful grip of 
myths about the future on the present” [39:15]. 
Still, it is also important to recognize that charisma plays an 
important, even indispensable, role in our lives. Charisma – 
whether from leaders or technologies – can provide direction 
and conviction, smoothing away uncertainties and helping us 
handle contradictions and adversities. Rob Kling asserts that 
faith in technology can play a major role in cultural cohesion: 
“During the 1930s,” he explains, “this almost blind faith in 
the power of the machine to make the world a better place 
helped hold a badly shattered nation together” [30:48]. As 
such, the purpose of this paper is not to ‘prove’ charismatic 
technologies ‘wrong,’ because matters here is whether 
charisma is still ideologically resonant.   
THE CHARISMA OF ONE LAPTOP PER CHILD 
OLPC’s laptop, called the ‘XO,’ was the first of its kind to 
combine a rugged design, an open-source educational 
software suite, and full (though purposefully underpowered, 
in an attempt to prolong battery life) computer functionality, 
with the goal of overhauling education across the Global 
South. The project is a culmination of over forty years of 
work at the MIT Media Lab and its predecessors, particularly 
the intellectual legacies of MIT professors Seymour Papert 
and Nicholas Negroponte. While many were involved in 
OLPC, Negroponte and Papert together were largely 
responsible for establishing the direction of the project. 
Both Negroponte and Papert are themselves charismatic, and 
both used it to build the charisma of the OLPC project and 
the XO laptop. While Negroponte has been the public face of 
the project, glibly flinging XOs across stages at world 
summits to demonstrate their ruggedness [64] and talking 
about “helicopter deployments” of laptops to remote areas 
[66], Papert was the project’s intellectual father. His whole 
career focused on the idea of computers for children, leading 
to the development of LOGO, Turtle Graphics, Lego 
Mindstorms, and, finally, One Laptop per Child. Though the 
results of these projects have been lackluster at best 
[4,6,51,55,67], Papert is still often considered a central figure 
in education and design (e.g. [8,20]), and his books remain 
foundational to the curriculum at the MIT Media Lab [2]. 
While the charisma of these two men were important to 
OLPC, I also want to emphasize that OLPC’s XO laptop 
itself included a host of charismatic features that were 
eagerly discussed in the tech community and media alike, 
even when some never actually existed and others did not 
work in practice. In this way, the machine itself embodied 
and performed its charisma, and the discussion around the 
machine amplified and perpetuated these promises. 
One of the most charismatic features of the initial proposal 
for the laptop was a hand crank for manually charging it. 
Though this feature never existed in a working prototype and 
all laptops in use were charged via standard AC adapter [53], 
journalists still mention the hand crank or make claims based 
on its presumed existence. Two antennae “ears” on either 
side of the screen, which also acted as latches and covers for 
ports, were added to visually replace it (Figure 1). They also 
served to anthropomorphize the laptop, as did the person-like 
“XO” name/logo which, when turned on its side, was meant 
to look like a child with arms flung wide in excitement.  
The XO included a “view source” keyboard button, a feature 
hailed as revolutionary even though web browsers had long 
included a similar function. Moreover, the button often did 
not work and I never saw it used in months of observations. 
The laptop’s hardware was meant to be similarly accessible, 
and OLPC leaders boasted about the laptop being particularly 
easy to repair. However, compromises with manufacturers 
and cost-cutting made this promise unattainable as well, and 
projects were plagued with breakage [4,53]. 
The laptop had an innovative screen, invented by fellow MIT 
Media Lab professor and founding OLPC contributor Mary 
Lou Jepsen, that could be swiveled and flattened, and its back 
light turned off, like an e-book – though I found that the 
screen was also the second-most-common component to 
break and the second-most-expensive to replace [53]. The 
first-generation XO included a mesh network so that laptops 
could connect to one another directly without an access point, 
though in practice the underpowered laptops would grind to a 
halt if more than a few were connected and the feature was 
dropped from later versions of the laptop’s software [53,65].  
Even the original name of the project – the “hundred-dollar 
laptop” – was never achieved: the lowest price was $188 
[6,53]. This in part was because OLPC’s goal of having 
hundreds of millions of laptops in use across the Global 
South also never came to fruition – instead, about 2.5 million 
have been sold, most of them in Latin America [6]. 
And yet, none of these niggling realities mattered. For several 
years after its debut and even today in the popular press, the 
project and its charismatic green machine were the darlings 
of the technology world. High-profile technology companies 
including Google, Sun, Red Hat, and others donated millions 
of dollars and hundreds of hours of developer labor to the 
project from 2005 to 2008. The open-source community, 
wooed by the promise of a generation of children raised on 
free software, continue to enthusiastically contribute to the 
development of OLPC’s custom-built learning platform, 
Sugar. Unsubstantiated and quite likely apocryphal stories 
about children teaching parents to read, of impromptu laptop-
enabled classrooms under trees, or of the laptop’s screen 
being the only light source in a village (never mind how the 
laptop itself was recharged) were echoed enthusiastically 
across the media and tech worlds. Even today, with ample 
evidence that OLPC has not lived up to these promises, they 
are still repeated, and XO laptops have been added to the 
collections of major art museums. 
These hyperbolic claims themselves, whether based on 
design features or more general claims about how the laptop 
would change the world, became part of the machine’s 
charisma. The project’s leaders, like many who lead 
development projects, had the utopian, if colonialist 
[6,17,27], desire to transform the world – not only for what 
they believed would be for the better but, as we will see, in 
their own image. Negroponte infamously said that the project 
and laptop “is probably the only hope. I don’t want to place 
too much on OLPC, but if I really had to look at how to 
eliminate poverty, create peace, and work on the 
environment, I can't think of a better way to do it” [63]. 
Though Negroponte made an easy target by often saying 
outrageous things that sometimes left even others on the 
project shaking their heads or backpedaling, many on the 
project echoed variations on this particular theme. 
This raises the question, though, of why these worlds so 
enthusiastically accepted these claims. Here is where the 
charismatic authority of the XO laptop becomes important. 
Again, my goal here is not to ‘prove’ OLPC’s charisma 
‘wrong’: highlighting the project’s continued charm despite 
its many failures is simply a method for demonstrating that 
charisma is indeed at play. In the next three sections, I will 
show how this charisma was based on specific ideas about 
childhood, school, and computers. As I describe in more 
detail in [3], OLPC hoped to replace a school experience that 
Papert claimed had ‘no intrinsic value’ [49:24] with a 
computer to encourage children to learn to think 
mathematically [48]. This was aimed at elementary school 
students who were assumed to be precocious, scientifically-
inclined, and oppositional. Not coincidentally, this target 
audience matched developers’ conceptions of their own 
childhoods. In the following sections, I will briefly describe 
each of these and why they were important to the charisma of 
OLPC’s XO laptop. Then I will show that these same themes 
undergird a number of other historically charismatic 
technologies, demonstrating charisma’s conservatism. 
Figure 1. The XO in standard laptop configuration, showing the 
first-generation Sugar interface (promotional picture).  
The charisma of childhood 
One Laptop per Child explicitly stated and implicitly built 
into their laptop the idea that children are born curious and 
only need a small impetus (such as a computer or an 
electronics kit) to keep that curiosity alive and growing. 
OLPC moreover specified the kinds of learning that children 
are naturally inclined to do: engineering-oriented tinkering. 
In this section, we will briefly consider the cultural narratives 
that Papert, Negroponte, and others draw on about what 
childhood should mean and what constitutes a good one, 
narratives that have become deeply rooted in middle-class 
American culture and reflect American cultural values such 
as individualism and (certain kinds of) creativity. 
This ideology of childhood, though seemingly universal, is 
historically, geographically, and socioeconomically situated. 
Childhood came to be understood as a distinct developmental 
state in nineteenth-century Europe and America 
[12,26,38,70,71], an ideological shift that was justified with 
Romantic-era ideals of childhood as a noble state closer to 
nature. These ideologies of childhood spread to mainstream 
middle-class parenting culture by the mid-twentieth century 
[26,32,70], when the idea of nurturing childhood creativity, 
play, and individualism through consumerism (via large 
numbers of aspirational toys) gained popularity among 
middle-class white American families [45,46].  
Around this time, toy manufacturers began to reinforce the 
idea that engineering was a space for natural masculine 
creativity through construction toys aimed at boys [16,45,46], 
even though those patterns of play were relatively new and 
far from universal [12]. Alongside these shifts, ‘healthy 
rebellion’ also became an accepted part of American boy 
culture [38,46]. Far from the more ideologically intimidating 
rebellion that threatens to actually change the status quo, the 
rebellion that is sanctioned in boyhood is often tolerated as 
‘boys will be boys’ or even encouraged as free-thinking 
individualism. From Mark Twain’s Tom Sawyer to today, 
popular culture has linked these relatively harmless forms of 
rebellion against school and society with creative confidence, 
driven by ‘naturally’ oppositional masculine sensibilities.  
The charisma of OLPC’s laptop references this ideology of 
childhood. As I show in [3], though the XO was ostensibly 
for children of any gender, its design echoed tropes of 
boyhood specifically: its mesh network embodied a 
resistance to authority and its programming-focused 
applications echoed the engineering toys that companies had 
been marketing to boys for almost a century before [46]. 
Papert’s and Negroponte’s writing also often praised 
iconoclastic or free-thinking children – generally boys – who 
took to computers (and to their experiments) easily. In the 
process, they glossed over the many complexities of 
childhood – not to mention how things like household 
instability or food insecurity affect learning – by 
universalizing children as natural ‘yearners’ [49]. 
These actors also referenced these ideologies of childhood in 
discussing themselves. In his writing, for example, Papert 
describes himself and others like him as part of a rarefied 
group that has managed to hold onto the magic of childhood: 
independent thinkers, lifelong learners, and, not 
coincidentally, many in the hacker community. They 
generalized from experiences with largely white, middle-
class American youth – or from their own idiosyncratic 
childhoods – that all, most, or at least the most ‘intellectually 
interesting’ [49:44–50] children are innately drawn to 
tinkering with computers and electronics, or in Papert’s 
words, ‘thinking like a machine’ [48]. 
The anti-charisma of school 
The One Laptop Per Child project frames itself and its laptop 
as a radical break from an unchanging global educational 
tradition [7,43,48–50]. In contrast to the naturally curious 
state of children, OLPC leaders paint school as a stultifying 
rote experience that has not changed in over a century 
[42,43,48,49]. In his writing, Papert villanizes what he calls 
‘instructionism,’ or lecture-heavy, curriculum-based 
education. Papert argues that instructionism creates people 
‘schooled’ to think in limited ways and seek validation from 
others out of ‘yearners,’ the innate, creative, playful state of 
children, focused on thinking independently, not caring what 
others think, and seeking answers via many routes for 
questions in which they are personally interested [49:1].  
Papert is unequivocal about his disdain for school, calling the 
classroom ‘an artificial and inefficient learning environment’ 
[48:8–9] with ‘no intrinsic value,’ its purpose molding 
children out of their natural state and into a more socially 
‘desirable’ form [49:24]. With the exception of a few brave 
teachers who fight against the establishment [49:3], Papert’s 
description of a monolithic ‘School’ (always capitalized) is 
of an institution unchanged for over a century, ‘out of touch 
with contemporary life,’ and shamelessly ‘impos[ing] a 
single way of knowing on everyone’ [49:1–6]. 
Papert is not alone in the expressing scorn for education. 
Many of OLPC’s contributors, whether affiliated with MIT 
(including MIT professors) or the open-source software 
community, describe similar sentiments (e.g. [9,25,41]). 
Even though not all people in the OLPC community actually 
rejected school (and many, in fact, excelled), they published 
and shared narratives about how boring, stifling, and 
unfulfilling classroom education was.  
These narratives resonated in the technology community as 
well as across American culture more broadly, where it is 
common, and even encouraged, to disparage public education 
and recount tales of terrible teachers (while excellent ones are 
often forgotten, and the role of school as a social leveler or 
cultural enricher are similarly unmentioned). In this way, the 
anti-charisma of school has become a common cultural trope, 
and we will critically examine it later in this paper. For 
OLPC, it served two purposes. First, it aligned the project 
with this broader backlash against public school. Second, it 
provided a rhetorical foil to ideologies of childhood – an 
opportunity to reinforce the importance of individualism, 
(technically-inclined) play, and rebellion important to the 
idea of childhood OLPC relies on.  
The charisma of computers 
As an alternative to school, Papert proposes giving each child 
a ‘Knowledge Machine,’ a clear forerunner to OLPC’s XO 
laptop. Indeed, many who have watched a child with a 
touchscreen or a videogame have marveled at how children 
seem to be naturally enamored with technology. Stories 
abound of precocious young children, especially boys, who 
seem to take to electronics fearlessly and naturally 
[41,48,49]. Both Papert and Negroponte rhapsodize about the 
‘holding power’ that computers can have. Papert says,  
The computer is the Proteus of machines. Its essence is its 
universality, its power to simulate. Because it can take on a 
thousand forms and can serve a thousand functions, it can 
appeal to a thousand tastes. [48:viii] 
The stories OLPC tells about the potentials of its charismatic 
laptop roll into one package many of the promises connected 
to computers and cyberspace: of newfound freedoms and 
potentials for computer-based self-governance, of the 
inversion of traditional social institutions (putting, of course, 
the computer-savvy like themselves at the top), of the 
“flattening” of bureaucracies, of the end of geographic 
inequity, of a “reboot” of history [30,39,44,54,60,61,69]. 
Even though computerization has largely entrenched existing 
power structures, these ideals of the computer age live on, 
especially among technologists whose cocooned middle-class 
existence may not bring them in contact with those whose 
lives and livelihoods have not benefited from these 
technologies or who have been actively excluded from the 
wealth in the technology world. 
The connection between rebellion and computing cultures is 
also well-established, particularly as countercultural norms of 
the 1960s were embraced by early cyberculture communities 
[60,61]. Narratives about the kinds of ‘all in good fun’ 
rebellion that computers could enable were popularized with 
the establishment of the ‘hacker’ identity in the 1980s (e.g. 
[21,35]). This imbued cyberspace with metaphors of the 
Wild West, of Manifest Destiny, of a new frontier of radical 
individualism and ecstatic self-fulfillment [60,61,69]. It also 
encouraged a libertarian sensibility, where each actor is 
considered responsible for their own actions, education, and 
livelihoods – conveniently ignoring the massive 
infrastructures that make the cyberspace ‘frontier’ possible. 
These ideals of computers and cyberspace motivated OLPC’s 
commitment to provide computers to children around the 
world, and helped the project resonate with many, from 
journalists to governments, similarly enamored with 
technology. Imbued with this infinite potential, laptops could 
take priority over teachers, healthcare, even food and water. 
And they took on yet greater power in utilizing ideas of 
childhood, school, and computers together, as we see next. 
The nexus of childhood, computers, and learning: the 
charisma of the self-taught hacker 
These three ideologies come together in One Laptop per 
Child through the narrative of the self-taught hacker and 
developers’ desire to bring the experiences of their own 
childhoods to other children around the world [3]. Papert, for 
one, explicitly credits his own formative experiences with 
computers as inspiration for the project. “I realized that 
children might be able to enjoy the same advantages” with 
computers as himself and other MIT hackers, Papert explains 
in his book The Children’s Machine – “a thought that 
changed my life” [49:13]. 
In conversations with OLPC developers and those who 
identify as ‘hackers’ across Silicon Valley and in Boston, I 
often encountered the story of ‘teaching myself to program.’ 
These actors describe learning about computers as something 
they did on their own, driven by feelings of passion and 
freedom, and independent of any formal instruction 
[24,25,41,58] – just as OLPC’s intended beneficiaries are 
meant to do. Shunning school in favor of this libertarian 
learning model, these people saw their excitement kindled 
and powers developed from their personal relationship with 
computers, with hours spent tinkering with Commodore 64s 
or Apple IIs, chatting with others in BBS’s or Usenet groups. 
But as I dug deeper into how this self-learning worked, I 
found that in all cases they benefited from many often-
unacknowledged resources. This included a stable home 
environment that supported creative (even rebellious) play, 
middle-class resources and cultural expectations, and often 
(though not always) a father who was a computer 
programmer or engineer. Moreover, many also 
acknowledged, sometimes readily, that they were not typical 
among their peers in their youth, and were often shunned for 
their unusual interests or obsessions. Even among peers who 
also had computers at home they were often unique in their 
interest in learning to ‘think like a machine,’ while many 
others with the same of access were not nearly as captivated 
by computers.  
However, neither Negroponte nor Papert discuss the 
possibility that they, and their students at MIT, enjoyed 
privileged and idiosyncratic childhoods, nor do they dwell on 
the sociotechnical infrastructure that enabled that privilege. If 
anything, Papert’s accounts of employing his theories in 
classrooms or other settings (e.g. see [48,49]) reinforce 
notions of exceptionalism by focusing exclusively on the few 
engaged children, those rare emblems of ‘success’ who 
appear to prove his theories, and ignoring the rest. 
OLPC’s idea of the self-taught learner who disdains school 
for computers also discounts the critical role that various 
institutions – peers, families, schools, communities, and more 
– play in shaping a child’s educational motivation and 
technological practices. Instead, Papert and other OLPC 
developers essentialize the child-learner and make the child 
and the laptop the primary agents in this technosocial 
assemblage, favoring technological determinism – all it takes 
is the right kind of computer to keep kids as ‘yearners’ – over 
the complicated social processes involved in constructing and 
negotiating childhood. 
This reliance on personal experience underscores an 
ideological slippage between the ideas taken up by XO 
laptop designers and children’s activities on the ground [5,6]. 
OLPC aimed to provide access to pedagogical materials with 
the assumption that children’s interests would take care of the 
rest, but did not account for their own idiosyncratic 
childhoods and ultimately reinforced existing socioeconomic 
and gender inequalities [5,6,53]. Their reliance on personal 
experience also enabled their naturalized images of 
childhood to justify a particular set of normative social 
objectives. Locating these slippages, and the tenacity to 
which supporters held to their ideals even when confronted 
with them [2], provides a powerful method of identifying 
charisma and uncovering its possible consequences.  
PUTTING OLPC’S CHARISMA IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
As we have seen, OLPC’s charisma has the ability to evoke 
awe, a feeling of spiritual transcendence, and utopian visions 
for the kind of world that its laptops might make possible. In 
particular, the XO rolled into one package many of the 
promises also connected to computers and cyberspace, to 
childhood and play, and to learning outside of school. A key 
component of this charisma was its ability to evoke the 
nostalgic stories that many in the technology world tell about 
their own childhood experiences with computers. The project 
has the utopian, if colonialist [17,27], desire to remake the 
world in its own image. 
However, OLPC’s XO laptop is but the latest in a long line 
of charismatic technologies. Historians of technology show 
that from the railroad in the mid-nineteenth century to the 
Internet today, many new technologies have been hailed as 
groundbreaking, history-shattering, and life-redefining. 
“Since the earliest days of the Industrial Revolution,” 
Langdon Winner writes, “people have looked to the latest, 
most impressive technology to bring individual and 
collective redemption. The specific kinds of hardware linked 
to these fantasies have changed over the years … [b]ut the 
basic conceit is always the same: new technology will bring 
universal wealth, enhanced freedom, revitalized politics, 
satisfying community, and personal fulfillment” [69:12–13]. 
Here, I briefly describe the history of charismatic 
technologies as a way to locate and bound OLPC’s charisma. 
Historian David Nye identifies the first time feelings of 
redemption were linked to a new technology in his 
description of the locomotive of the mid-nineteenth century. 
From the inauguration of America’s first rails in Baltimore in 
1828 to the completion of the transcontinental line at Utah’s 
Promontory Point in 1869, Nye describes a nation gripped 
with railroad mania. The railroad was implicated in dozens of 
hyperbolic claims, including the “annihilation of space and 
time” [29] with its sustained speed, the demise of manual 
labor with steam, a liberation of humankind from 
provincialism via increased contact and communication, the 
triumph of reason and human ingenuity, an ‘engine’ of 
progress and Western expansion, and a guarantor of 
economic development for all it reached [44].1 
Even when railroads cost vastly more time, money, and 
human lives to construct than anticipated, and even when 
they did not bring endless prosperity and worldliness to their 
termini, the locomotive’s charisma persisted for some time, 
in the same way that subsequent charismas did over a century 
later as highways were laid down alongside or over rail lines 
and as airports replaced train stations as the newest symbols 
of progress and modernity [39,44,54]. Indeed, these same 
utopian discourses were applied to many other technological 
advances over the next century – many of which we now take 
for granted – including the steamboat, canals, bridges, dams, 
skyscrapers, the telegraph, electricity, the telephone, the 
radio, the automobile, television, cable television, and more 
[16,39,44,54,62]. Even the airplane was hailed as a “winged 
gospel” that would “foster democracy, equality, and 
freedom” – despite its terrifying wartime role [69]. 
While it may be easy to discount these past charismatic 
technologies given the perspective and tarnish of time, they 
contain two lessons, one about the enduring importance of 
charisma to the modern cultural imagination, and the other 
about its limits. In particular, there is a striking parallel 
between the charisma of computers that OLPC draws on and 
these earlier charismatic technologies. Historian Howard 
Segal notes that the rhetoric of the power of the Internet to 
spread democracy “was identical to what thousands of 
Americans and Europeans had said since the nation’s 
founding about transportation and communications systems, 
from canals to railroads to clipper ships to steamboats, and 
from telegraphs to telephones to radios” [54:170]. Vincent 
Mosco also notes these similarities in a call for both more 
empathy for the past and more skepticism of the present. 
“We look with amusement, and with some condescension,” 
he writes, “at nineteenth-century predictions that the railroad 
would bring peace to Europe, that steam power would 
eliminate the need for manual labor, and that electricity 
would bounce messages off the clouds, but there certainly 
have been more recent variations on this theme” [39:22].  
In short, a historical perspective helps (in William Stahl’s 
words) “break the spell of the present” [56]. It demonstrates 
that today’s charismatic technologies are neither natural nor 
inevitable, but are ideologically conservative: even as they 
promise revolution, they repeat the charisma of past 
technologies and ultimately reinforce the status quo. This, in 
turn, allows us to better identify new charismatic 
technologies and to understand charisma’s consequences. 
The next section examines a charismatic technology that 
provides these lessons for One Laptop per Child: the radio.   
                                                           
1 Nye also notes the flip side of the sublime: a small group decried 
the locomotive as a “device of Satan” because of its ‘unholy’ speeds 
[44]. While a discussion of dystopianism is beyond the scope of this 
paper, it is the flip side of utopianism: though ruled by fear instead 
of hope, it is still beholden to the same ideologies [30,39,69]. 
Lessons from the charismatic radio 
Of all the charismatic technologies of the past, the one that 
has the strongest resonances with the charisma of computers, 
education, and childhood – charismas that OLPC relies on – 
is the radio. Aside from an increasingly marginalized culture 
of HAM radio operators, it can be hard to imagine radio in 
the U.S. (today so often a commercialized audio wasteland of 
top-40 songs on repeat, with a few public stations limping 
from one pledge drive to the next) as an intensely charismatic 
technology. But radio took 1920’s America by storm, 
capturing the country’s collective imagination with promises 
blending technological miracles and manifest destiny. 
Historian Susan Douglas explains that radio, as envisioned in 
1924, “was going to provide culture and education to the 
masses, eliminate politicians’ ability to incite passions in a 
mob, bring people closer to government proceedings, and 
produce a national culture that would transcend regional and 
local jealousies” [16:20]. Commentators described the 
replacement of telegraph wires with radio waves with 
psychic metaphors and compared it to magic [16:41].  
Many of the amateur enthusiasts and educators who 
pioneered radio were especially excited by the medium’s 
apparent ability to transcend political and economic controls, 
enabling virtual communities and informed populism – all 
hopes that have been echoed more recently about computers, 
the Internet, and OLPC. After all, Mosco observes wryly, 
“How could any material force get in the way of invisible 
messages traveling through the ether?” [39:27] 
However, many things can and did get in the way of radio’s 
utopian dreams. Douglas notes that until the Internet, the 
radio was the main medium where struggles between 
commercialism and anti-commercialism played out, in a 
cyclic pattern, over decades [16:16]. When nascent radio 
stations and other businesses realized how much money 
could be made selling advertising time on the radio, they 
advocated for commerce in the ‘ether.’ Governments, too, 
wanted to control this new technology, and most either took 
complete control or shared bandwidth with industry, 
sidelining educators, amateur operators, and other early 
enthusiasts with little leverage to realize their own hopes. 
Even by the 1930s, a mere decade after radio’s most 
charismatic days, “radio was no longer the stuff of 
democratic visions” [39:27] – much like OLPC has receded 
into the fog of history for many former supporters a decade 
after its debut, or the Internet, now decades old, is gradually 
co-opted for commercial interests. 
Still, the small group of dedicated enthusiasts who had 
pioneered the medium – almost all men – continued to use 
radio to “rebel against the technological and programming 
status quo in the industry” [16:15], flaunting intellectual 
property, government rules, and big business in the process 
[39:2]. This group continued to conceptualize their pastime 
of tinkering, listening, and programming the radio as a 
“subversive” activity [16:15] and maintained their equally 
subversive hopes for the future of the wireless medium. And 
it is understandable that they would be loath to give up their 
dreams. These “Radio Boys,” as Mosco identifies them, were 
initially the “heroes” of the Radio Age, “youngsters who lent 
romance and spirit to the time by building radios, setting up 
transmitters, and creating networks” [39:2]. But as 
compelling as their messages may be to anyone sympathetic 
to contemporary hacker culture, the dreams of the Radio 
Boys did not prevail. As radio became more commercialized, 
the connection between technological tinkering and utopian 
thinking largely receded into niche communities such as 
HAM radio [23] until reappearing, with a new set of actors 
but some remarkably similar practices, around the networked 
personal computer [35,58,61] – the actors that Papert says 
inspired his work on designing a ‘children’s machine.’ 
Historians have argued that remarkable parallels between this 
group and the ‘hackers’ who designed personal computers, 
the Internet, and OLPC’s XO laptop are no accident. The 
charisma of radio, computers, the Internet, locomotives, and 
more draws on the same set of utopian stories about 
technology, youth, masculinity, rebellion, and self-
determination. For instance, the individualist strains in these 
earlier technologies found voice in the cyber-libertarianism 
of recent decades [61]. The new frontiers of the imagination 
that the railroad opened in mid-nineteenth century America 
are rhetorically echoed in the new frontiers of radio in the 
1920s and cyberspace in the 1980s, spaces of radical 
individualism and ecstatic self-fulfillment [60,61,69]. The 
charismatic appeal of tinkering that 1920s ‘Radio Boys’ 
championed found voice again in computer hacking, in 
projects like OLPC, and most recently in maker culture [3]. 
Thus, while the technologies that these charismas are 
attached to may shift with time, the charisma lives on. 
What could be problematic about the feelings that these 
charismatic technologies can evoke, at least when still 
relatively new? After all, many of these technologies did, in 
time, transform the technosocial worlds in which they 
existed. However, Vincent Mosco argues that we actually 
prevent these technologies from having their full effect as 
long as we remain enthralled by their charisma. It was not 
until they recede into the ‘mundane’ and we understand how 
they could fit into the messy realities of daily life, rather than 
making us somehow transcend it, that they have the potential 
to become a strong social force [39:2,6,19]. If this is the case, 
then perhaps it is just now, with the spell of OLPC broken, 
that the XO laptop can start to show its lasting effects among 
those using it. Time, and independent analysis [6], will tell. 
Lessons from technologies in educational reform 
Education is of course not immune to the draw of charismatic 
technologies. In fact, educational reform has been a target of 
techno-utopian discourse long before the One Laptop per 
Child project was announced, even before Papert began his 
career of studying children and computers. Charismatic 
technologies from radio to the Internet have been hailed as 
saviors for an educational system seemingly perpetually on 
the brink of failure [62]. The hyperbolic promises of OLPC 
echo these ongoing efforts to combine the twin promises of 
charismatic technology and school reform to reach for utopia. 
Because learning was the central goal of OLPC, examining 
the history of charisma in this context lets us contextualize 
the project and identify other charismatic technologies that 
pervade education. Moreover, a survey of the history of 
school reform shows that much of the anti-charisma of 
school described above is based more in stereotypes than 
fact, reinforced by a century of technological failures in 
education. Finally, we will see that education reforms like 
OLPC are often compelled to use charismatic technologies to 
promise utopia in order to secure attention and funding, 
which then sets them up for failure and short-lived projects. 
As reformers then shift to the next charismatic technology, 
charisma will continue to impede real, if incremental, 
change. 
Over at least the last century and a half, American schools 
have been simultaneously held up as the foundation for 
reforming society and under constant pressure to reform 
themselves. Starting in the 1830s, upper-class activists such 
as Horace Mann evangelized the idea of ‘common schools’ 
as a savior from moral ruin, detailing the horrors that could 
result (and, in some cases, were resulting, for instance via 
unregulated child labor) if the country did not adopt universal 
public schooling [14:8,62:1, 16, 141–142]. Far from the 
‘factory worker mills’ framed in some more recent 
educational reform literature (see [48,49] for examples from 
Papert), public schools and subsequent innovations in 
schooling such as age-organized instruction (and sometimes 
the abandonment of it), curriculum-based instruction (and 
sometimes the abandonment of it), cheap paper and 
textbooks, kindergarten, subject-separated instruction, middle 
school, school lunch, desegregation, televised instruction, 
and even standardized tests were all framed by socially and 
politically elite reformers for more than a century and a half 
as a cure-all for assimilating immigrants and marginal 
populations, ending child labor, modeling good citizenship, 
and instilling morality in the next generation [13,14,62]. 
The panacean promise of education was gradually shifted in 
the late twentieth century from moral to economic. In 
introducing “Great Society” educational reforms meant to 
eliminate poverty in the 1960s, President Johnson avowed 
that “the answer to all our national problems comes down to 
a single word: education” [62:2]. Two decades later, as 
perceptions of the United States’ waning influence prompted 
a sense of panic about reforming education to achieve 
economic competitiveness, President Reagan’s National 
Commission on Educational Excellence and Reform took up 
the specter of impending dystopia in an alarmist report titled 
A Nation at Risk: The Imperative For Educational Reform 
that to this day motivates U.S. educational reform [13,14,62]. 
Throughout these efforts, reformers often implicated the 
technologies most charismatic at the time as integral to 
achieving their visions. Some technological innovations, like 
chalkboards, inexpensive paper, overhead projectors, and 
computer-assisted standardized testing, have, in fact, had 
large and lasting effects on schools. But some of the most 
charismatic technologies have not. Many media and 
communication technologies including early motion pictures, 
radio, television, and computers were (and, in the latter case, 
still are) often championed as fast cure-alls for educational 
woes by innovators who were often not involved in public 
schools themselves. “Impatient with the glacial pace of 
incremental reform, free of institutional memories of past 
shooting star reforms” that left no effect in day-to-day 
schooling, and “sometimes hoping for quick profits as well as 
a quick fix,” Tyack and Cuban explain, these reformers 
“promised to reinvent education” with technology [62:111]. 
Like the more general utopian visionaries of technology 
discussed in previous sections, many of these innovators 
over-promised the scope and ease of change and lacked a 
nuanced understanding of the day-to-day social, cultural, and 
institutional roles of the actors most directly involved in the 
worlds they wanted to transform. When the messy, 
expensive, time-consuming realities of using technology in 
the classroom inevitably clashed with hyperbolic promises, 
disillusioned innovators, along with the media and the 
general public, would often blame schools and especially 
teachers for not solving problems with technological 
adoption that were, in reality, beyond their reach. Then, 
research on the effects on the new technology in the 
classroom would start to roll in, showing that the technology 
was, as Tyack and Cuban describe, “generally no more 
effective than traditional instruction and sometimes less” 
[62:121–122]. Meanwhile, attention and resources had been 
diverted from more complicated, expensive, or politically 
charged social or educational reforms that did not promise a 
quick fix [62:3] and were thus less ‘charismatic.’ 
This is not to say that reform or technological adoption in 
education is impossible. Though the broader institutional 
structures of schools and many of the strategies teachers use 
to reach students appear to be unchanged, there have been 
many successful innovations that have altered the daily lives 
of students and teachers, sometimes dramatically. Still, even 
more realistic reforms well-grounded in the realities of 
students and schools sometimes have difficulty gaining broad 
popular support outside of the school unless they add a 
charismatic gloss of rapid, revolutionary change.  
This charismatic pressure can put even open-eyed 
educational reformers in a catch-22 [6]. They must promise 
dramatic results to gain the social and financial support for 
reforms, and then they must either admit to not achieving 
their goals, or pretend that they did achieve them. Either way, 
funders will declare that the project is finished and withdraw 
financial support, and then researchers and other observers 
will begin to note the discrepancies between reformers’ 
promises and their own observations. Thus, projects that rely 
on charismatic technologies are often short-lived, cut off 
before charisma recedes into the background and the 
technology can become part of everyday classroom 
experience. This catch-22 has dogged educational reform for 
well over a century, and as the educational technology 
community moves on to the next charismatic technologies 
(whether they be MOOCs or makerspaces), it will continue 
to hamper the possibility of real, if incremental, change. 
What is the alternative to this catch-22 of charismatic 
education reform? Incremental reforms, what Tyack and 
Cuban call “tinkering,” are more effective in the long-term, 
even if they are not charismatic. “It may be fashionable to 
decry such change as piecemeal and inadequate, but over 
long periods of time such revision of practice, adapted to 
local contexts, can substantially improve schools,” they 
explain. “Tinkering is one way of preserving what is valuable 
and reworking what is not” [62:5]. 
CONCLUSION 
Through an analysis of One Laptop per Child and a survey of 
past charismatic technologies, this paper exposes the 
ideological stakes that underpin charisma – the ability for 
technologies (or, as originally theorized, people [68]) to 
evoke feelings of awe, transcendence, and connection to a 
greater purpose. It shows how the promises that charismatic 
technologies make are ideologically charged, how they can 
be identified, and what is at stake when we are drawn in. 
While it may be easy to discount examples from the past 
given the perspective and tarnish of time, taking a historical 
perspective on charismatic technologies show us how 
conservative charisma actually is – the same kinds of 
promises have been made over and over, with different 
technologies – and also how unattainable its promises are.  
Examining charisma can help us understand its effects and, 
through understanding, counter them. This analysis is meant 
to help ‘make the familiar strange,’ in Stuart Hall’s words 
[22], helping researchers in human-computer interaction to 
identify the ideological commitments of the technology 
world. Analyzing a technology’s charisma helps us recognize 
ideologies that may otherwise be as invisible as water is to 
the proverbial fish. While concrete design suggestions are not 
the goal of this paper, this analysis may also help designers – 
who often hope to ‘do good’ through technological 
intervention in ways similar to those analyzed here – identify 
their own ideological commitments.  
To OLPC’s contributors, we saw that the charisma of the XO 
laptop affirmed their belief in the power of computers in 
childhood, imposed coherence and direction on their work, 
and gave them reasons to push back against doubters, even in 
the face of what might otherwise feel like overwhelming 
odds or ample counterevidence [2]. On the other hand, we 
saw that charisma could also have a blinding effect. It 
prevented those on the project from recognizing or 
appreciating ideological diversity, much less constructively 
confronting problems of socio-economic disparity, racial and 
gender bias, or other issues of social justice beyond most of 
their personal experiences [47]. OLPC’s XO laptop was 
charismatic to them because it mirrored their existing 
ideologies and promoted a social order with them at the top. 
As a result, their narratives not only glorified childhood, they 
specified the kinds of learning that children are naturally 
inclined to do. In glossing over the many complexities of 
childhood with universalizing concepts like ‘yearners’ and 
‘schoolers,’ Papert and others in OLPC drew on cultural 
narratives about what childhood should mean and what 
constitutes a good one, narratives that have become deeply 
rooted in American culture and reflect American cultural 
values such as individualism and (certain kinds of) creativity. 
These actors have generalized from their experiences with 
largely white, middle-class American youth – or from their 
own idiosyncratic childhoods – that all, most, or at least the 
most ‘intellectually interesting’ [49:44–50] children are 
innately drawn to tinkering with computers and electronics, 
or in Papert’s words, ‘thinking like a machine’ [48]. 
The case of OLPC shows us why it is dangerous to ignore the 
origins of charisma: one risks being perpetually blinded by 
the newest charismatic technology as a result. Indeed, those 
who pin reform efforts on charismatic technologies are often 
caught in a catch-22 where their projects are cut short 
whether they register success or not, because the promises of 
charisma are ultimately unattainable.  
Moreover, as long as we are enthralled by charisma we might 
actually prevent these technologies from becoming part of 
the messy reality of our lives, rather than helping us 
transcend it. We must remember that charisma is ultimately a 
conservative social force. Even when charismatic 
technologies promise to quickly and painlessly transform our 
lives for the better, they appeal precisely because they echo 
existing stereotypes, confirm the value of existing power 
relations, and reinforce existing ideologies. Meanwhile, they 
may divert attention and resources from more complicated, 
expensive, or politically charged reforms that do not promise 
a quick fix and are thus less ‘charismatic.’ 
Still, it is also important to recognize that charisma plays an 
important role in smoothing away uncertainties, 
contradictions, and adversities. As such, the purpose of this 
paper is not to ‘prove’ charisma ‘wrong.’ What matters is 
whether a technology’s charisma is ideologically resonant – 
whether it taps into deep-seated cultural values and identities, 
as OLPC does with childhood, school, play, and technology.  
This paper’s intention is likewise not to advocate for an 
eradication of ideologies; just as it is impossible to escape the 
bounds of our own subjective points of view, so too is it 
impossible to operate entirely outside of the frameworks of 
ideologies. However, a large body of Marxist theory (e.g. see 
[22]) notes that becoming cognizant of the ideological 
frameworks in which we operate allow us to evaluate 
whether they are really serving the purposes we hope or 
assume they are. Only by way of this cognizance can we shift 
them if they are not. 
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